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The Coalition Government has recently made the most substantial changes to anti-social behaviour 
(ASB) legislation since it was enacted in 1998.  Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s flagship AŶti-Social Behaviour Order 
(ASBO) has been replaced as part of a raft of reforms to streamline the tools and powers available to 
tackle ASB.  This paper examines the legislative changes to ASBOs and the proposed impact of these 
changes by considering the turbulent development of their replacement: the Injunction.  ASBO 
reforms are subsequently analysed within broader transformative processes currently being 
undertaken in the criminal justice system, with specific reference to the Transforming Rehabilitation 
agenda and the probation service.  A lack of evidence-based policy; rushed changes, payment 
incentives and marketisation are highlighted in this paper as cross-cutting concerns between these 
two different, but ultimately interconnected policy domains. Ultimately the changes to ASB 
legislation are deemed to be superficial, although it appears the foundations are being laid for more 
radical changes in the future. 
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Introduction 
The Coalition took up office iŶ ϮϬϭϬ ǁith the pƌoŵise to take ͚ƌadiĐal aĐtioŶ to ƌefoƌŵ ouƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal 
justiĐe sǇsteŵ͛ ;HM GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt, ϮϬϭϬ: ϭϯͿ.  This proposal is examined here in light of recent 
changes to anti-social behaviour (ASB) legislation, situating these adjustments in relation to broader 
reformative processes being undertaken to community justice and pƌoďatioŶ thƌough the CoalitioŶ͛s 
Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) agenda.  The purpose of this paper is to question whether the 
changes to ASB legislation are as radical as initially suggested and to explore a number of cross-
cutting criminal justice policy concerns highlighted in volume 11:2/3 of the British Journal of 
Community Justice entitled ͚TraŶsforŵiŶg ‘ehaďilitatioŶ - Under the Microscope͛.  It appears the 
ideological and practical concerns provoked by the TR agenda are evident, albeit to a lesser extent, 
in the developments to ASB legislation.  
 
The paper begins with an appraisal of the changes to ASB legislation proposed by the Coalition in the 
form of the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill; specifically focusing on the reforms to Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBOs) to create the Injunction. The passage of the Bill through Parliament is then 
considered, examining the tensions that arose when it reached the House of Lords and the 
subsequent amendments.  The implications of these changes are then discussed in relation to 
broader criminal justice policy concerns that have been highlighted by plans to implement TR, 
determining the extent to which the changes in ASB legislation have been radical. 
 
Legislative Changes  
ASB legislation has remained fairly static since its inception in 1998 through the Crime and Disorder 
Act and the extended powers provided by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act of 2003. Reflecting different 
politically populist themes, Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s A“B ageŶda demonstrated evolving policy foci; for example 
ŶuisaŶĐe Ŷeighďouƌs iŶ Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s fiƌst teƌŵ, eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal A“B iŶ the second and youth 
intervention in the third
1
. The Coalition Agreement (HM Government, 2010), where the 
commitment to radical change was stated, sets out nineteen specific criminal justice reforms, albeit 
none relating to ASB.  However, since 2011 the Coalition has pursued the legislative reform of ASB 
with the primary objective of jettisoning the ASBO. Arguably the most well-known ASB sanction, 
ASBOs can be sought by the relevant authorities to hand down to anyone over the age of 10 to 
prevent behaviour that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.  They operate for a 
minimum period of two years with the potential to operate indefinitely.  There is no restriction on 
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 A full account of New Labour's ASB agenda and the challenges faced by the Coalition government can be 
found in Hodgkinson and Tilley (2011). 
the type(s) or numbers of behaviour ASBOs sanction.  Breaching the terms of an ASBO constitutes a 
criminal offence punishable by up to five years͛ imprisonment for adults and a two year detention 
and training order for young people, or a fine of up to £5000. 
 
With ASBOs (and ASB in general) regarded as a steadfastly New Labour creation, designing new tools 
and powers to sanction ASB presented an opportunity for the Coalition to markedly change a policy 
area that both constituent Coalition parties (the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) fiercely 
criticised whilst in opposition (BBC News, 2006).  The 2012 White Paper Putting Victims First - More 
Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour outlines the CoalitioŶ͛s ǀisioŶ to stƌeaŵliŶe the existing 
19 sanctions to just 6, with ASBOs being replaced by Crime Prevention Injunctions.  Despite 
conflating the issues of crime and ASB, these injunctions intended to offer speedy redress to those 
suffering ASB by being both handed down and sanctioned through civil law.  The Home Office 
(2012a: ϮϰͿ states ͚ouƌ iŶjuŶĐtioŶ ǁill ďuild oŶ the suĐĐess of the A“B IŶjuŶĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh soĐial 
landlords use effectively to stop problems and protect victims, and which is faster and easier to use 
thaŶ the A“BO.͛  Specifically for use by social housing providers, Anti-Social Behaviour Injunctions 
(ASBIs) can sanction nuisance and annoyance that affects the housing management function of the 
landlord. With this much looser definition of troublesome behaviour, ASBIs became popular with 
practitioners seeking speedy remedies for ASB (Heap, 2010), with their use surpassing ASBOs in 
some locations (Clarke et al, 2011).   
 
What the White Paper fails to clarify is how the ASBI utilises a different ASB definition to ASBOs; 
͚nuisance and annoyance͛, compared to ͚harassment, alarm or distress͛.  The failure of the Home 
Office to explicitly detail this difference at the outset, perhaps assuming their readership would be 
familiar with the finer points of ASB and housing law, had stark consequences when the White Paper 
eventually progressed into the Bill at the House of Lords.  Fundamentally, replacing the ASBO with 
an Injunction that implements the nuisance and annoyance definition further widens the pre-
existing broad range of behaviours considered under the ASBO͛s harassment, alarm or distress 
definition.  Despite providing the opportunity to sanction troublesome low-level nuisance (as the 
White Paper promises), there is the very real danger that legitimate behaviour conducted by 
marginalised groups could suffer at the behest of persistent complainers.  For example, young 
people playing football in the street may not be deemed to cause harassment, alarm or distress, but 
the repetitive thud of footballs could well be considered to cause nuisance and annoyance. The 
broad nature of the proposed definition could encompass almost any annoying behaviour; as such 
the new injunctions could technically be used to curb people: mowing the lawn at 9am on a Sunday, 
trick or treating at Halloween and talking loudly on mobile phones whilst using public transport.  
 
Flippancy aside, this is problematic from a human rights perspective as it reprises and exacerbates 
the original criticisms levelled at ASBOs by Ashworth et al. (1998) and Pearson (2006) in relation to 
Article 5 (liberty and security of the person), Article 6 (right to a fair and public hearing) and Article 8 
(right to a private and family life) of the European Convention for Human Rights.  An even broader 
definition creates the possibility that more people will be brought under the jurisdiction of the 
criminal justice system, amplifying the net-widening and mesh-thinning concerns brought about by 
ASBOs (Cracknell, 2000; Brown, 2004).  The nuisance and annoyance definition could also facilitate 
the extended use of the injunctions by the authorities to sanction difficult and/or persistent 
offenders instead of prosecution, in the knowledge that a breach will result in an easier prosecution 
(Burney, 2009).  The swift application procedure would also prove more favourable to practitioners 
in this instance. 
 
The White Paper also emphasises a fresh policy focus on victims.  The heighteŶiŶg of A“B ǀiĐtiŵs͛ 
needs coincides with a number of tragic high-profile cases, such as Fiona Pilkington and Suzanne 
Dow who both took their own lives (and in the case of Pilkington also the life of her disabled 
daughter) as a consequence suffering persistent  ASB that was not adequately addressed by the 
authorities.  This marks a completely new direction for ASB; very little attention has been paid 
specifically towards victims in the past as previous legislation and policy has focused heavily on 
tough enforcement (Millie, 2009; Duggan and Heap, 2014).  As an overall strategy, this coalesces 
with broader Coalition criminal justice policy modifications, with the prioritisation of victims also 
evident in hate crime (for example; Challenge it, Report it, Stop it: The Government's Plan to Tackle 
Hate Crime (HM Government, 2012)) and domestic violence domains (the Domestic Violence 
Disclosure Scheme (House of Commons Library, 2013)).  The heightened regard for ǀiĐtiŵs͛ needs 
espoused by the Coalition is considered a vote-winning tactic and has been discussed elsewhere (see 
Duggan and Heap, 2013; Duggan and Heap, 2014).  ASB itself is suggested to serve a political 
function (Bannister et al., 2006), with evidence to show New Labour pursued ASB innovations 
around the time of general elections as a vote-winner (Heap, 2010).  A proposition reconsidered 
later in this papeƌ͛s analysis. 
 
The White Paper evolved into the Draft Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill (2012), which 
began its passage through Parliament in May 2013.  This reflects a relatively slow progression from 
the initial mooting of legislative changes by the Home Secretary in 2010 (May, 2010), followed by 
the consultation in early 2011 (Home Office, 2011) and the White Paper in 2012.  During this time 
the Crime Prevention Injunction had morphed into the newly titled Injunction to Prevent Nuisance 
or Annoyance (IPNA).  The full remit of the IPNA is generally similar to the ASBO, with the relevant 
authorities given powers to apply for an injunction applicable to anyoŶe oǀeƌ the age of ϭϬ ǁho ͚has 
engaged or threatens to engage in conduct capable of causing nuisance and annoyance to any 
peƌsoŶ͛ ;Gƌeat BƌitaiŶ, PaƌliaŵeŶt, House of Loƌds ϮϬϭϯͿ.  
 
The IPNA process is conducted in the civil courts (County Court for adults and the Youth Court for 
young people) rendering the burden of proof to be based on the balance of probabilities.  The 
original ASBO began with a civil burden of proof, until a successful legal challenge ensured future 
ASBOs were based on the higher burden of proof of beyond reasonable doubt.  The consequences 
for IPNA breach are slightly blurry, with the Home Office Draft Guidance (2013: 27) proclaiming:  
 
͚ďƌeaĐh of aŶ IPNA is Ŷot a ĐƌiŵiŶal offiĐe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, due to the poteŶtial seǀeƌitǇ of the 
penalties which the court can impose on respondents, the criminal standard of proof - 
͞ďeǇoŶd ƌeasoŶaďle douďt͟ - is applied in breach proceedings.͛ 
 
The criminalisation comes from breaching the injunction which is a civil contempt of court.  The 
penalties for breach are slightly less severe than ASBOs, with adults facing up to two years 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.  Sanctions for juveniles include Supervision Orders and in 
more serious cases a Detention and Training Order.  The terminology surrounding IPNA breach is 
potentially problematic for both offenders and victims.  Unless well-versed in the complexities of 
civil law, the implications for breach appear unclear.  Breaching the Injunction is not a criminal 
offence unlike the ASBO, but the evidence required to punish a breach must be scrutinised to the 
criminal standard of proof. This does little to resolve the criticism levelled at ASBOs for containing 
elements that recipients find difficult to understand (Fletcher, 2005), with this issue compounded for 
those with mental health problems and/or learning difficulties (British Institute for Brain Injured 
Children, 2005).  
 
In turn, if the penalties for breach are not criminal, a tension arises between putting victims first and 
fuelling criminalisation through net-widening.  One of the rationales provided by the Home Secretary 
for pursuing changes to ASB legislation was to eŶsuƌe the Ŷeǁ saŶĐtioŶs ͚aĐt as a ƌeal deteƌƌeŶt͛ 
(Home Office, 2011: 1). However if the sanctions for breaching IPNAs are not criminal, it is 
questionable whether perpetrators are going to be deterred from committing ASB. This is underlined 
by the fact that the effectiveness of ASBOs, which were criminal upon breach, was questioned by the 
Home Office (2011) because of increasing breach rates. Home Office and Ministry of Justice data 
shows 58% of ASBOs between 2000-2012 were breached at least once, with the average number of 
breaches per ASBO totalling 4.9 (HM Government, 2013). The likelihood may be that IPNAs will be 
breached just as much as ASBOs. Furthermore if the new sanctions are not stopping and preventing 
A“B, ǀiĐtiŵs͛ Ŷeeds aƌe Ŷot ďeiŶg ͚put fiƌst͛ as espoused ďǇ the politiĐal ƌhetoƌiĐ. Research already 
suggests victims do not consider ASB sanctions harsh enough (Heap, 2010), therefore IPNAs are 
unlikely to bolster confidence in victims that their needs will be met. 
 
The element of IPNAs that definitively sets them apart from ASBOs is the ability to include positive as 
well as prohibitive conditions.  This means recipients can be required to do something to address the 
underlying causes of their behaviour.  Theoretically this is a positive step for ASB legislation, which as 
a whole has been criticised for failing to address the causes of ASB and being too enforcement led 
(Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011).  An example of a positive requirement could mean nuisance 
neighbours attending mediation sessions or receiving drug/alcohol treatment.  However, the failure 
to comply with any positive requirements also results in a breach of the Injunction similar to 
prohibitive conditions. Consequently, even if the ASB has been stopped by the prohibitive 
conditions, the failure to meet the requirements of the IPNA͛s positive condition(s) could result in 
the perpetrator receiving a prison sentence. This means an individual could be imprisoned for failing 
to commit an act, even when the act in question is legal. Furthermore, this reductivist logic assumes 
a causal relationship between the completion of the positive condition and the ASB stopping; rather, 
the interplay of a wide range of variables could occur to ameliorate the problem behaviour.  ASBOs 
were renowned for their potential to imprison someone for breaching non-criminal prohibitions 
such as swearing in the street, but legislating to allow a potential custodial sentence for failing to 




Amending the Changes - Back to ASBOs? 
The ASB, Crime and Policing Act received royal assent in March 2014, but despite experiencing a   
relatively smooth passage through the House of Commons, its progress through the House of Lords 
was turbulent.  This section will examine some of the concerns raised by the Lords and how their 
intervention resulted in amendments to the Bill, which profoundly altered the IPNA. 
 
The House of Lords raised two key concerns with the IPNA provisions.  Firstly, there was 
apprehension about the civil burden of proof being too low, with a prediction of numerous IPNAs 
being handed down for relatively innocuous behaviours ranging from carol singing to nudism (HL 
Debate 13/14). Subsequently, an amendment was tabled to revise the threshold from the balance of 
probabilities to beyond reasonable doubt. If successful, this would have re-aligned the IPNA to the 
ASBO, giving it less resemblance to the ASBI upon which it was based. Social housing providers and 
ǀiĐtiŵs͛ adǀoĐates ǁeƌe agaiŶst these proposals due to the increased time required to secure an 
IPNA at the higher threshold and the necessity for (often frightened) victims to have to appear in 
court for instances of minor ASB (Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group, 2014). After much 
debate, the Lords were unsuccessful in passing this amendment, which further highlights the tension 
between balancing ǀiĐtiŵs͛ needs and potential broadening criminalisation. 
 
The ultimately successful second amendment opposed the nuisance and annoyance definition. Lord 
Dear tabled an amendment for the definition to be reinstated as harassment, alarm or distress, the 
same as ASBOs.  This ŵoǀe ǁas ͚ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the legal ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt that the laǁ should ďe 
precise and not undermine fundameŶtal huŵaŶ fƌeedoŵs͛ ;HL Debate 13/14), which ultimately 
reflects some of the net-widening and mesh-thinning apprehensions outlined in the previous 
section.  However, another amendment re-shaped the proposed legislation further still.  This split 
IPNA provisions into housing and non-housing related categories.  The housing IPNA retains the 
same housing management functions outlined in the old ASBI, but the powers have been extended 
to include provision for private landlords and residents.  It will retain the nuisance and annoyance 
definition, essentially creating a tenure-neutral ASBI.  This does not abate concerns surrounding the 
potential for increased criminalisation associated with the nuisance and annoyance definition; 
however it does create a more equitable situation because the sanctions are no longer targeted at 
social housing tenants alone, which contrasts the broader penalisation of poverty used to manage 
those at the lower end of the class structure (Wacquant, 2001). Nevertheless, it is yet to be 
determined how provision for private tenants and residents will translate into practice, with the 
latest government Spending Round projecting a further £11.5 billion of public funds need to be 
saved (HM Treasury, 2013). 
 
The other aspect of the IPNA covers everything apart from housing, it is a civil injunction based on 
the balance of probabilities, with the definition relating to harassment, alarm or distress; strikingly 
similar to the traditional ASBO, aside from the potential to include a positive requirement. To an 
eǆteŶt this addƌesses soŵe of the ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the CoalitioŶ͛s Ŷet-widening agenda, as most 
types of ASB will be considered under the tighter definition. In essence, this is principally an ASBO 
with a new name.  Indeed the name of these sanctions proved problematic once the over-arching 
nuisance and annoyance definition was removed. Since the Bill received royal assent, a decision was 
takeŶ to ƌefeƌ to these saŶĐtioŶs siŵplǇ as ͚IŶjuŶĐtioŶs͛, ǁith this ǁoƌdiŶg now evident in the 
published Act (Great Britain, 2014). It remains unclear how the Injunctions will be referred to in 
popular discourse; a ďlaŶd title ŵaǇ ƌeŵoǀe the ͚ďadge of hoŶouƌ͛ status attƌiďuted to A“BOs, 
although some distinction will be required demarcate this Injunction from other injunctive 
provisions. 
 
Implications and Cross-Cutting Concerns 
It is clear the action taken to reform ASB powers has been far from radical.  This assertion is not new, 
with Hodgkinson and Tilley (2011) suggesting an early incarnation of the proposals simply amounted 
to rebranding.  However, the amendments pursued by the House of Lords have made this legislation 
even more like the original ASBO than the initial consultation first suggested. This demonstrates how 
the CoalitioŶ͛s management of ASB policy is deficient, allowing parallels to be draw to other areas of 
criminal justice experiencing change, specifically the TR agenda and changes to the probation 
service.  
 
The CoalitioŶ͛s Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform consultation response document 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013a) outlines a range of proposed fundamental reforms to the way offenders 
are rehabilitated.  The key modifications include: extending statutory rehabilitation to offenders 
sentenced to less than 12 months in custody, creating a nationwide resettlement service, 
marketising rehabilitation providers (dismantling the current probation service) and implementing 
new payment incentives (payment by results), and creating a new national probation service.  The 
proposals have been far from well received by academics and probation practitioners alike, with 
Senior (2013: 1) warning the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of these ĐhaŶges iŶĐlude ͚fƌagŵeŶtatioŶ, loss of 
expertise, conflicts of interest, inconsistent practices and the danger to public safety that would 
result from confusion on risk ĐategoƌisatioŶ͛.  This section will consider cross-cutting concerns in 
both ASB and probation that relate to practical implications of the changes including: research 
informed and evidence-based decision making, the rushed nature of the changes, payment 
incentives and marketisation.    
 
The CoalitioŶ͛s T‘ pƌoposals have been criticised for being ideologically driven rather than evidence 
based.  Concerns abound from a range of perspectives, including: there being no evidence base for 
the planned organisational changes, with some proposals even contradicting existing research 
evidence (Senior, 2013); anxieties around the future use of accredited interventions grounded in 
evidenced based evaluation (Gilbert, 2013); and the suggestion that future evidence of ͚what works͛ 
will be closely guarded by private companies motivated by profit (McNeill, 2013).  The changes in 
ASB policy have also been ideologically driven with a disregard for evidence, albeit in a markedly 
different manner.  Very little evaluative work has been undertaken to ascertain which ASB 
iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs ͚ǁoƌk͛ as a consequence of inconsistent data collection mechanisms, that are largely a 
result of local ASB definitions, priorities and practises.  The Home Office never evaluated the flagship 
ASBO (Chambers, 2010). Although Clarke et al. (2011) and Crawford et al. (2012) have assessed the 
impact of ASB tools and powers, both refrained from using the term evaluation.  Accordingly the 
Coalition has had little option but to pursue a non-evidence based framework, although this does 
not justify merely rebranding the ASBO. The Home Office made it clear they wanted to dispose of 
the ASBO due to concerns over high breach rates (Home Office, 2011) and there is evidence to show 
ASBOs declining usage (Clarke et al., 2011). Worrying, there is no suggestion of any impetus to 
evaluate the new powers, despite the NatioŶal Audit OffiĐe  suggestiŶg ͚DepaƌtŵeŶts should puďlish 
a list of significant evaluation gaps in their evidence base, and should set out and explain their 
pƌioƌities foƌ addƌessiŶg those gaps͛(2013a: 10).  Although considering the current situation in 
probation, it does not seem to matter if there is evidence in place to dictate practise or not.  
Therefore an overarching disregard for developing evidence based policy is shared across probation 
and ASB, giving the impression that the Coalition (and to some extent New Labour are guilty here 
too iŶ ƌelatioŶ to A“BͿ do Ŷot Đaƌe aďout ͚ǁhat ǁoƌks͛.  This generates the proposition that changes 
in both policy domains were made for the sake of change. 
 
Inherently linked with the notion of deliberate and visible change is the suggestion that these 
changes were rushed; a criticism which Senior (2013) has already ascribed to the TR plans.  The same 
can be said for the ASB developments, although there are some key differences.  As mentioned 
previously, the build-up to the legislative changes to ASB were relatively slow, with nearly two years 
passing between the consultation (Home Office, 2011) and the draft Bill (Home Office, 2012b). In 
contrast the proposals to implement TR arrived quickly, with the initial consultation being held 
between January and February 2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2013b), with consultation published in May 
2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). It was when the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill got to Parliament that 
the pace quickened. In fact, the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill and the Offender Rehabilitation Bill 
(legislating the TR plans) both had their first reading on the same day (9 May 2013), in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords respectively, with both receiving royal assent after eight months on 
the same day (13 March 2014). However when comparing the parliamentary passage of each Bill, 
the paths taken were very different. The ASB, Crime and Policing Bill was subject to a large number 
of sittings (15 committee and 2 report in the Commons with 7 committee and 4 report in the Lords) 
compared to the Offender Rehabilitation Bill (2 committee and 1 report in the Lords with 6 
committee and 1 report in the Commons). This highlights how the ASB legislation was subject to 
greater debate and more amendments in an equal amount of time. During the 2013/14 
Parliamentary session only two other Bills had a comparable number of debates: the Care Bill and 
the Energy Bill, both of which took longer to receive royal assent, taking ten months and thirteen 
months respectively. There is no set time period for Bills to pass, but it does appear the ASB, Crime 
and Policing Bill was passed very quickly, despite the complexity of the Bill itself. It is surprising 
Home Office Ministers did not intervene during the periods of debate considering the implications of 
essentially reverting back to ASBOs, given the justifications for change they made in the first 
instance.  The fact that it is likely to have been politically damaging for the Government to perform 
aŶǇ soƌt of ͚U-tuƌŶ͛ at suĐh a late stage, may have curtailed any intervention.  The populist ASBO-
scrapping rhetoric will probably continue and likely convince the general public, but ASB 
stakeholders (including victims) will be aware of the fallacy of these claims.  Overall, bulldozing 
through un-evidenced criminal justice policies is becoming symptomatic of the Coalition, which does 
little to meet the needs of offenders, victims or practitioners. 
 
Payment incentives are already a familiar concept in the ASB sphere, as a result of the introduction 
of payment by results (PbR) to the Troubled Families Programme (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2012).  Although in contrast to probation, it is Local Authorities not private 
companies that are incentivised in the criminal justice element of programme (as opposed to the 
welfare element).  Initial findings from the National Audit Office (2013b: 7) demonstrate PbR in this 
setting remains a work in progress, suggesting ͚there is a lack of information on costs and the non-
intervention rate (the level of outcomes that would have been achieved without the programmes)͛, 
making it difficult to set the correct payment threshold.  This ƌeiŶfoƌĐes HeddeƌŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ feaƌs 
about this precise issue occurring in a probation context. Further concerns have also been raised 
about the performance level achieved by PbR in the Troubled Families Programme, with lower than 
anticipated outcomes attained to date. The iŶitial taƌget ǁas to ͚tuƌŶaƌouŶd͛ the liǀes of ϭϮϬ,ϬϬϬ 
families by 2015, although as of October 2013 only 22,000 families had been helped in this way 
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2014).  
 
Based on the pervasiveness of PbR in other aspects of the public sector such as National Health 
Service (National Health Service, 2013), its use in criminal justice was perhaps inevitable given the 
neoliberal tendencies of the Coalition, whereas opening the market to a range of new providers is 
something new for probation and ASB.  The move to introduce new providers to the rehabilitation 
market has been made explicit in the TR plans.  However, subtle shifts towards a marketisation 
approach in ASB appear to be taking shape.  For example, one method proposed to facilitate 
compliance with the Injunction͛s positive requirement is that the Injunction must state a person or 
organisation responsible for ensuring adherence to the positive condition.  The causation focused 
nature of the positive conditions means the individual or organisation taking responsibility is unlikely 
to be part of the criminal justice system.  For example, the individual may be a trained mediator or a 
drugs worker.  This could be seen as the first step in diffusing the responsibility for ASB away from 
criminal justice practitioners and onto other frontline service providers, who may not have 
experience of such supervision.  There is no indication at this stage that such organisations will 
receive PbR or be a private company, but taking into account the changes being made to the 
probation service it may not be too far in the distant future.  A further signal we may be heading in 
this direction is the news that private security firms, such as Sparta Security in Darlington, are 
beginning to undertake work tackling nuisance neighbours (The Northern Echo, 2014).  This may 
have profound implications on the way ASB is managed in the future. 
 
 
Conclusion - Future Gazing 
This paper has focused on exploring and reconciling criminal justice reforms in two distinct policy 
areas.  In doing so, it has uncovered matters of cross-cutting concern relating to both the ASB and 
probation reforms proposed by the Coalition Government.  One of the purposes of this paper was to 
question whether the changes to ASB legislation were radical iŶ light of the CoalitioŶ͛s pƌoŵise of 
radical criminal justice reform.  The evidence presented here suggests that at face value the changes 
have not been radical at all, in fact the Injunctions passed into law are fundamentally the original 
ASBO from 1998 with the addition of a positive condition.  However, when the ASB reforms are 
considered against some of the more radical changes proposed to probation; it is evident that the 
foundations for future radical changes have been laid, particularly in the case of payment incentives 
and marketisation.  ASB stakeholders will undoubtedly follow how the probation changes unravel in 
practice, with one eye on the future of their own domain.  Practice is the area that closely binds the 
main concerns about the reforms, specifically around changes being rushed in for the sake of 
change, without a robust evidence base.  This illustrates how effective policy implementation has 
been disregarded by the Coalition, although it will be interesting to observe how the National Audit 
OffiĐe͛s ;ϮϬϭϯa) call for departments to address gaps in evaluation translates into reality.  The 
evidence-based policy dream may not come true in the near future, as it appears Coalition priorities 
are to produce shallow, populist policies that resonate with the electorate, with pre-general election 
sound bites likely to focus on something along the lines of ͞scrapping the useless ASBO” and ͞cutting 
the cost of proďatioŶ”.  
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